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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LUCILE M. HALE, an Individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15771 
RALPH FRAKES, an Individual, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
A. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IS LARGELY UNRESPONSIVE 
TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Respondent's brief is, in large part, unresponsive 
to the argument of Appellant. It is clear that a claim 
to land under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
requires that the claiming party establish four elements: 
(a) The line must be open, visible and marked by monuments, 
fences or buildings, (b) mutual acquiescence in the line 
as boundary, (c) for a long period of years, (d) by 
adjoining landowners. The establishment of all four ele-
ments creates the presumption of a legally binding agree-
ment as to the boundary, which presumption must be over-
come by specific evidence that there was no agreement. 
Holmes v. Judge, 31 U. 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), Tripp v. 
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Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 P. 912 (1928). This brief shall 
point out how Respondent's brief is largely unresponsive 
to the issues of law involved. 
B. RESPONDENT NEVER RESPONSIVELY DENIES THAT 
THE LINE HAS BEEN OPEN, VIS IBLE AND MARKED 
BY MONUMENTS, FENCES OR BUILDINGS 
Appellant's brief relates the law as being that 
ancient monuments may be relied upon as actual boundaries 
if, under the facts, reliance upon such is reasonable. 
Reliance may even reasonably be placed in zigzagging 
lines when it appears that the line is reasonably the 
boundary. Respondent does not responsibly deny the exist-
ence of an ancient fenceline but only recites that the fence 
was built on Respondent's property and that a prior law 
suit involved this disputed land. Testimony of both 
parties-litigant at trial established beyond doubt that 
the fence and its predecessor fence were of very ancient 
origin. 
Though it is not made clear in Respondent's brief, 
his recitation that the fence was built upon his land and 
that there has been a previous suit regarding the disputed 
land probably goes to whether the parties could have 
reasonably relied on the fence as a boundary. By his 
recitations Respondent attempts to show that reliance was 
2 
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not reasonable, because Appellant had actual and or 
constructive knowledge that the true boundary was not 
marked by the fence. 
But in Appellant's brief the argument develops 
the fact that no ordinary man would have known from the 
legal descriptions of his deed that the fence was misplaced 
by two rods. Even a surveyor's surveyor presumes that 
fences are correctly placed until his calculations are 
complete and his determinations final. Further, nothing 
in Appellant's chain of title recites that her land is 
subject to an easement for road along the disputed 
boundary. Recitations regarding an easement for road 
along the West side are conspicuous and by such con-
spicuousness create the justified impression that if 
there were an easement to the South it would have been 
mentioned, and also, irregularities in the chains of title 
create the impression that, in light of past courtroom 
contest regarding the boundary, any disputes concerning 
the boundary must have been settled and the fence had 
memorialized the settlement. 
None of the instant disputants nor their still living 
predecessors in title had first hand knowledge of the suit. 
Neither are they put on constructive notice of the result of 
3 
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such suit unless it is somehow noted in their chains of 
title. The relevant documents relate that Appellant's 
predecessors quitclaimed interest in and to land in 
Section 23, but Appellant and her predecessors all rea-
sonably assumed that the fence marked the border of 
Section 14 and 23. It is expressly for this type of 
dispute that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
should be applied to resolve boundary desputes in favor 
of the long-lived statusquo. 
The Tripp v. Badley, supra, doctrine is directly 
applicable here. The doctrine lays down no rules on what 
geometric forms lines must follow; it simply states that 
above all else, reliance on the disputed line must be 
reasonable. Though it would be unreasonable to rely 
on the fence as the boundary now that an authoritative 
survey has been performed, it was not unreasonable when 
the interested parties first started using the land as 
farm land. 
C. THERE HAS BEEN BOTH FACTUAL AND IMPLIED IN 
LAW MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LINE AS THE 
BOUNDARY 
contrary to Respondent's bold assertion, factually, 
there was no evidence presented at trial that Appellant's 
oredecessors in interest actually knew where the true 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
boundary line was or even that they suspected that the 
fence may have been misplaced. It is true that Respondent's 
predecessor did claim that he had said something about the 
fence not being on the property line, but it was not shown 
at trial what he said or how it was said. If something 
truly was said, it is clear that it never brought home to 
his neighbors what his argument was. To the contrary, 
Appellant's witness testified that from the time he was a 
small boy working on his father's farm, they always farmed 
right to the fence line: They claimed up to,where they 
thought the section line was and always considered it as 
their land. But, very importantly, Respondent's predecessor 
in title also admitted under cross examination that not once 
in the long history of the fence did he ever interfere with 
his neighbors' exclusive use of the land on the opposite 
side of the fence, even though he was personally aware that 
there was a dispute as to the exact boundary. In any sense 
of the word there was a true, actual acquiescence to the 
fence as the boundary line. 
As regarding the implied in law acquiescence, respond-
ent does not answer Appellant's argument that a true and 
actual acquiescence is not even required, but that if the 
parties 
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" ••• have occupied their respective boundaries 
up to an open boundary line visibly marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings for a long period 
of time and mutually recognized it as the dividing 
line between them, the law will imply an agree-
ment fixing the boundary as located, if it can do 
so consistently with the facts appearing, and it 
will not permit the parties nor their grantees to 
depart from such line. Homes v. Judge, 31 u. 269, 
87 P. 1009." Brown v. Milliner, 120 u. 16, 
232 P.2d 202 at 204. (See also, Hummel v. Young, 
1 U.2d, 237, 265 P.2d 410, Ringwood vs. Bradford, 
2 U. 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053). 
from the fact that a fence line has existed for an extended 
length of time arises the legal presumption that the fence 
line exists where the parties have deemed the boundary line 
to exist. 
Further, Respondent does not ever respond to the 
wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (1974) and the Baum v. 
Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (1974) line which asserts that fences 
built solely to control animals and not as boundaries can 
become boundaries when 
•••• the property on either side of such a fence 
is conveyed to separate parties, so that there 
comes into being separate ownership of the tracks 
on either side, and the circumstances are such 
that the parties should reasonably be assumed to 
adopt the fence as the boundary between their 
properties, then from that time on, the time 
during which the fence continues to exist, should 
be regarded as going toward the fulfilling the 
time requirement for the establishment of 
boundary by acquiescence. Baum, supra, at 727. 
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In the instant dispute the period of time contemplated 
by the Baum holding began sometime before the early 1930's. 
The key to why Respondent does not respond to such 
arguments lies in his continued insistence that the deeds 
of Appellant describe land in Section 14 and never give 
title to land in Section 23. From this, Respondent assumes 
that Appellant can never reasonably believe that the fence 
is the boundary, because it is clearly located in Section 23. 
It is now clear that the fence is in Section 23, but only 
because a surveyor's surveyor found a true S~ction corner 
after trudging miles in all four directions and finding 
obscure markers covered with mud, which no ordinary man would 
have recognized for anything more than mud-covered stones. 
At the time Appellant's predecessor and Appellant were 
working the land the fences were the best clue to where 
the boundary lay, especially in light of their ancient 
existence and the undisturbed use of the land right up to 
the fence and the lack of clear objection from the 
Respondent or his predecessor. 
D. THE FENCE HAS INDISPUTABLY STOOD FOR A 
PERIOD OF YEARS 
There is no doubt that the fence has been in existence 
at least since 1933, and there was also another fence in 
existence before 1933 upon the same location. This fact 
7 
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is established by Appellant's witnesses and by Respondent's 
predecessor who was the one who constructed the fence in 
1933 over the pre-existing fence. 
E. THE FENCE HAS INDISPUTABLY STOOD BETWEEN 
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS 
There should be no argument here that the Appellant 
and Respondent are adjoining landowners. Respondent does 
not take issue with the argument made in Appellant's brief 
that, as an adverse possession, the parties should be allowed 
to tack the holding periods of their successors in title. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The four elements required to establish a claim to 
land by the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence were all 
established at trial. The (1) line certainly was visible 
and (3) stood for at least forty years (4) between the 
adjoining landowners. Elements one, two and four are 
factually indisputable. The major dispute lies in the 
second requirement that (2) there must be an acquiescence 
in the line as the boundary. Factually, there has been 
such an acquiescence. The testimony of Appellant and her 
predecessors in title, Orval Petersen, was that there was 
never any doubt in their minds that the fence marked the 
true boundary. Without the aid of an official county 
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survey it was more than reasonable to assume that the 
fence was the true boundary-this is precisely what the 
Courty Surveyor would have done according to his testimony. 
Regardless of what iny of the parties-litigant have been 
thinking, for as far back as any living soul remembers, 
Appellant and her predecessors have never enjoyed less 
than complete, undisturbed use of all the land right to 
the fence. 
Also, as an implication of law there has been such 
acquiescence for the law presumes agreement upon finding 
that a monument has served as the effective boundary for 
many years. In order to overcome the presumption the law 
requires more than a showing of no agreement. Respondent's 
predecessors did testify, though, that he had told Appellant's 
predecessor that he did not consider the fence to be the 
boundary line, but those to whom he reputedly told 
this were men who were conspicuously dead or absent at 
trial. The brother of one who was supposedly told that 
the fence was off the line testified at trial that he was 
not aware that there was any dispute to the boundary and 
that he, his brother and father had always farmed right to 
the fence. 
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Respondent never answers the argument now clearly 
established in Utah law that a fence, though built to 
hold animals - a purpose other than marking a boundary - be-
comes a fence marking a boundary by acquiescence when the 
tracks enter different hands than those which first built 
the fence and the fence is later used as a dividing line, 
such is the case here. 
Upon the law and the facts the trial court has erred. 
Therefore, Appellant renews his prayer for a reversal of 
the court below. 
Attorney for Appellant 
29 South Main Street 
P. o. Box U 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing two 
copies thereof, postage prepaid, to WALTER G. MANN, MANN, 
HADFIELD & THORNE, Attorney for Respondent, 35 First Security 
Bank Building, Brigham day of 
February, 1979. 
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